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The linkage between labor standards and trade agreements pursued by the US, and the 
burgeoning corporate codes of conduct that seek to strengthen core labor standards in global 
supply chains, has resulted in interest in the development of measures (or indicators) of core 
labor standards by a variety of organizations, such as the US dept of Labor, the ILO and several 
NGOs. We argue in this paper that measures of freedom of association and collective bargaining 
that are in use currently are incomplete and flawed, partly because they focus almost exclusively 
on whether the rights exist, without regard to practice, and partly because they tend to focus on 
easily available quantitative indicators that are necessary but insufficient indicators of the 
freedom of association and collective bargaining process. We develop new measures that draw 
on decades of comparative industrial relations research and which are based on the existing 
cross-national variation in industrial relations practice. Our suggested measures require national 
experts to use both quantitative data and qualitative research and judgment in their evaluation, 
and report it in consistent and transparent ways. Given that the connection between trade and 
labor standards makes the consequences of violation quite severe for developing countries, 
reliance on imperfect measures to make decisions about country performance on core labor 
standards is problematic. The measures advanced in this paper reduce that risk. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the assessment of labor standards in different countries has grown ever since 
the US government began the process of linking trade with labor standards. For example, 
legislation during President Clinton’s era mandated that the US Trade Representative must have 
information about the labor conditions of trading partners. This led to a plethora of efforts to 
develop effective measures (or indicators) to assess countries’ performance on the “core labor 
standards” (i.e. freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, elimination of all 
forms of forced and compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor, and the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation). 
Interest in indicators of labor standards also received a strong impetus with the global 
development of corporate social responsibility strategies. Over the last 15 years, as consumers 
and investors have demanded more “ethical” behavior from corporations, corporations have 
responded with codes of conduct for their global supply chains (either in response to consumer 
pressure, or as a “preventive” against adverse public opinion). The proliferation of corporate 
codes of conduct has resulted in a proliferation of firms (e.g., Global Social Compliance) and 
NGOs (e.g., Verite, Fair Labor Association, Workers Rights Consortium) who “monitor” these 
codes for compliance, and some of these NGOs have also been in the forefront of the 
development of “indicators” of core labor standards. More recently, the focus on indicators of 
labor standards has heightened after the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
Implementation Act (commonly referred to as the Peru Free Trade Agreement) which came into 
force on December 14, 2007. Hailed by many as the first real attempt to tie U.S. trade policy to 
enforceable labor standards, the act received broad bi-partisan support.1 The US department of 
1
 The measure passed by a margin of 285-132 in the House of Representatives and 77-18 in the Senate 
(http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2007-1060). One of the key reasons for this law’s bipartisan 
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labor has developed new indicators of core labor standards, and the ILO published in October 
2008, a new report on the measurement of decent work. 
The goal of this paper is to briefly review existing indicators and develop new ones for 
one of the four core labor standards: the right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (FOA and CB). We focus on this particular labor standard for three reasons. First, 
agencies that monitor codes of conduct have often highlighted FOA and CB as the most difficult 
labor standard to assess. Second, corporations with codes of conduct have found that this is the 
labor standard which their supply chain is often least interested in complying with. Third, there is 
dissatisfaction with existing measures; a frequent criticism is that current indicators do not 
adequately capture the “processes” involved in labor relations. 
This last reason is particularly important. Given that freedom of association and 
collective bargaining are both processes, each with many underpinning institutions, rules, and 
sub-processes whose effectiveness is heavily mediated by individual and collective human 
behavior, it is difficult to arrive at quantitative indicators to capture these processes. We argue in 
this paper that the indicators regarding FOA and CB that have been developed thus far are 
problematic in several ways. They tend to be rather mechanistic and focus on quantitative 
indicators that say little about the processes of FOA and CB. They tend to focus almost 
exclusively on whether the rights exist, with little attention to whether those rights are actually 
exercised in practice. And, they are based on easily available information rather than on 
information that is more relevant but difficult and expensive to gather. We argue further that any 
assessment of FOA and CB requires an understanding of the variety of institutions and processes 
support, particularly within the Democratic caucus, centered around the inclusion of enforceable labor and human 
rights guarantees in the bill. For the first time in any free trade agreement, both the United States and Peru were 
required “to adopt and maintain domestic laws to implement the five core standards incorporated in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”. 
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underlying them, and the fine-grained qualitative judgments by experts familiar with that 
context. We therefore develop in this paper, new indicators of FOA and CB that can be added to 
the ones currently in use to improve overall assessment efforts. 
These new indicators are advanced based on several principles. The first principle is that 
the development of any indicator with respect to FOA and CB must be rooted in an 
understanding of rights, the administrative procedures involved and actual practices in any given 
context. Quantitative measures of rights are insufficient in and of themselves. Second, since FOA 
and CB are complicated processes in each national context, there is need for subjective and 
qualitative interpretation of rules and practices by national experts. Third, the development of 
indicators that can be used universally must recognize that the practice of FOA and CB varies 
dramatically from country to country, i.e industrial relations systems have not converged, but 
remain distinct and strongly embedded in a national institutional structure2, although practices 
tend to converge3. Thus, the new indicators that we develop are based on the existing knowledge 
of the variation in the practices of FOA and CB around the world. This knowledge draws on 
decades of research by scholars (mostly in labor relations and sociology) who have become 
expert in the use of qualitative research and judgment to describe how FOA and CB actually 
work in different countries. These principles make our indicators more relevant in the assessment 
of how nations make progress on this core labor standard. And given that FOA and CB are seen 
as foundational rights (a necessary condition for progress on the other core labor standards), it is 
crucial that they are measured realistically. 
2
 See, e.g., Lowell Turner & John Windmuller, Convergence and Diversity in International and Comparative 
Industrial Relations, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 192-208 (Maruice Neufeld 
& Jean JcKelvey eds., 1998); Sarosh Kuruvilla & Christopher L Erickson, Change and Transformation in Asian 
Industrial Relations, 41 IND. RELATIONS. 171-228 (2002). 
3
 See HARRY C KATZ & OWEN DARBISHIRE, CONVERGING DIVERGENCES: WORLDWIDE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS (2000). 
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In the next section we briefly review existing indicators, highlighting their advantages 
and disadvantages, followed by a section introducing new indicators. 
II. CURRENTLY USED INDICATORS OF F O A AND C B 
Our literature review reveals 28 different indicators of FOA and CB that are currently in 
use by a variety of organizations active in the assessment of core labor standards (Table 1). This 
is not an exhaustive list of indicators in the academic literature however,4 but are the ones that 
are used contemporaneously in monitoring and assessment. The indicators in Table 1 are 
roughly classified into four groups, and we briefly discuss each group in turn.5 
Table 1 about here 
Group 1 consists of available quantitative or quantifiable information. These include 
whether countries have signed the relevant ILO conventions, union density, collective bargaining 
coverage, and the number of strikes and lockouts. With regard to whether countries have signed 
the basic ILO conventions relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the 
advantage of this indicator is that the ratification status is easily compiled and found in publicly 
4
 See, e.g., Lance Compa, Assessing Assessments: A Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries’ Compliance with 
Freedom of Association Standards, 24-2 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y J. 283-319 (2003); Sarosh Kuruvilla, Social 
Dialogue for Decent Work, in DECENT WORK: OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES, (Dharam Ghai ed. 2006) for a more 
exhaustive list. We specifically excluded many Western-Europe-centric indicators. The academic literature on 
industrial relations in Western Europe has over the years developed measures of particularistic European labor 
relations phenomena such as tripartite F O A and C B , centralization of wage bargaining, union concentration etc. See 
for examples FRANZ TRAXLER, SABINE BLASCHKE & BERNHARD KITTEL, NATIONAL LABOUR RELATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONALIZED MARKETS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS, CHANGE AND PERFORMANCE (2001); 
Golden, Miriam, Peter Lange & Michael Wallerstein, Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies: 
An Empirical Study, available at www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data; LANE KENWORTHY, IN SEARCH OF NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS: BALANCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (1995); TORBEN IVERSEN, CONTESTED 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS: THE POLITICS OF MACROECONOMICS AND WAGE BARGAINING IN ADVANCED 
DEMOCRACIES (1999). These Western European indicators do not transfer well to countries without established 
systems of F O A and C B and centralized bargaining regimes (a majority of Third World countries fit this 
description). 
5
 For a detailed review, see the special issue 24-2 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y J . 281-401 (2003), especially see e.g., 
Margaret Hilton, Introduction: Monitoring International labor Standards, and Compa, supra note 4. 
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available ILO databases. Several studies have used this data to examine growth 6 , export 
performance7 and trade performance8. Chau and Kanbur9 even find that standards are higher in 
countries which ratify conventions than in countries that do not. The disadvantage of the measure 
is that not all countries have signed the relevant conventions. The US for example is not a 
signatory to the FOA and CB conventions, but FOA and CB rights are present in US law and 
practiced widely. Conversely, there are many countries that have signed the relevant conventions 
but have found ways to circumscribe these rights10 . Thus the central assumption here that 
signing the convention is suggestive of a basic commitment of a country to ensure that core labor 
rights are protected, or at a minimum, and at a minimum, not repressed, is questionable. Despite 
the problems with the measure, it has tactical value, because it is on the basis of violations of 
these rights that the ILO can use its powers of persuasion to convince countries to follow the 
conventions in practice. From the perspective of monitoring agencies that seek to measure the 
state of FOA and CB in countries, it is important to remember that signing the convention has 
relatively little to say about actual practices on the ground. 
Union density is perhaps the most commonly used measure amongst the quantitative 
indicators. It is a measure of the number of union members expressed generally either as a 
percentage of the “non agricultural” workforce or as a percentage of “wage and salary” workers. 
6
 Rama Martin, Do Labor Market Policies and Institutions Matter? The Adjustment Experience in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 9 LABOUR 243-68 (1995). 
7
 Jai S. Mah, Core Labor Standards and Export Performance in Developing Countries, 20 WORLD ECONOMY 773-
85 (1997). 
8
 Dani Rodrik, Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What do We Do about Them? In 
EMERGING AGENDA FOR GLOBAL TRADE: HIGH STAKES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 35-79 (ROBERT Z LAWRENCE, 
JOHN WHALLEY & DANI RODRIK, eds., 1996). 
9
 Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, The Adoption of International Labor Standards Conventions: Who, When, and 
Why? BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 113- 56 (2001). 
10
 See the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association - C O F A reports (available at 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?hdroff=1) that provide several examples of 
systemic violations in countries that have signed the conventions; For a detailed treatment of this measure, please 
see HEPPLE ROBERT, RIGHTS AT WORK (2003). 
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It has been used in several ways, including as a measure of union strength. It has been seen an 
important indicator of the potential for FOA and CB, the argument being that higher union 
density would be associated with more FOA and CB in a country. The key advantage is that it is 
easy to collect and the information is available for most countries. Research on Western 
European countries (where FOA and CB tend to be highly developed) invariably show a positive 
correlation between union density and a variety of positive macro-economic outcomes over time, 
including lower inequality. However, more global research shows that the relationship between 
union density and collective bargaining coverage is not linear11. 
There are several problems with the measure as well. First, there are problems in the way 
data is collected to measure union density. In most countries the number of union members (the 
numerator in the union density calculation) is based on self-reports from unions, and there is a 
strong tendency for unions to overstate their membership numbers. For example, the Philippines 
shows reported union density of 21% in 1998 (equivalent to 3 million members) at a time when 
only 600,000 members were covered by collective bargaining agreements12. Second, most 
countries outside of Europe do not evidence the positive correlation noted above. Third, union 
density as a proxy for union strength and as a basis for effective CB is questionable in countries 
where unions are not independent and subject to authoritarian control (e,g. China and Zimbabwe 
both report high union densities, with little or no CB). Finally, it is possible to have good FOA 
and CB rights in countries where union density is very low (for a variety of reasons, such as a 
very small industrial labor force). India’s union density is between 2 and 5%, but given that 
11
 Sarosh Kuruvilla, Subesh Das, Hyunji Kwon & Soon-won Kwon, Union Growth, Decline and Revitalization in 
Asia, 40-3 BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 431-463 (2002). 
12
 For a variety of union density measurement problems, see e.g., Kuruvilla, Das, Kwon & Kwon, Id. and Compa, 
supra note 4. 
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almost 90% of India’s labor force is an either agriculture or informal sectors, a low union density 
is not surprising. 
The third quantitative indicator frequently used is collective bargaining coverage (the 
percentage of the population that is covered by collective bargaining agreements). This figure 
tends to be very high in Western Europe, where some countries report almost 90% (often due to 
institutions such as centralized bargaining and the principle of extension), but in other countries 
tends to correspond more to union density. The advantage of this measure is that high coverage 
generally signifies healthy collective bargaining and healthy FOA as well. The disadvantage of 
this measure is that it is very difficult to collect this information systematically and on a regular 
basis. The ILO collected this information once in 1995, but has yet to update it. 
Data on strikes and lockouts are frequently used as well to signify whether the collective 
bargaining works in practice. One the one hand, a large number of strikes tends to indicate that 
the right to CB is routinely exercised, and in that sense, it is a good indicator. One the other 
hand, a small number of strikes might mean that labor relations is convivial or that the right to 
CB is not being allowed to be exercised. The supposedly “objective” data give rise to differing 
interpretations. 
Indicators in Group 2 focus broadly on rights with respect to FOA. These include 
whether the right exists, and a variety of variables that underpin the basic FOA right such as 
whether it is possible for trade unions to be independent, whether there are any restrictions in 
organizing rights, whether there is any weakening of FOA, whether workers are protected from 
discrimination for union joining or formation, whether the unions have the freedom to affiliate 
with higher union organizations or political parties, whether workers have genuine freedom to 
elect union representatives of their own choice, employer interference in the FOA process, and 
9 
whether the employer is allowed to make threats of the closure of factories to thwart freedom of 
associat ion. 
Interestingly, these indicators, while relevant, tend to focus on what is stated in the law, 
rather than whether the law is practiced. For example, Malaysia’s labor law permits local unions 
to affiliate with national or industry level unions. This is an important right since local unions 
often need the help of industry level or national unions in order to organize. However, Malaysia 
limits the right to affiliation in certain industries, such as electronics. As a result, there are very 
few unions in Malaysia’s electronics industry, one of its largest exporters and employers 13. 
Other countries limit the right to affiliation by mandating that a union can only affiliate with a 
designated federation (which is often sponsored by the government).In the case of the US, this 
right does exist in the law. But in practice, it does not effectively deter employees from firing 
workers for forming unions or other union activity, largely because the penalties for the 
violations of these provisions are not strong enough to deter employers, who repeatedly fire 
union activists14. 
Many of the indicators in this group are based on a simple perusal of labor law in 
different countries. One problem here is that the law is often not clear. As Compa notes 
“threshold evaluations can examine laws with relative ease to determine whether the right legal 
framework is in place to afford freedom of association to workers. However, most countries laws 
13
 Sarosh Kururvilla & Ponniah Arudsothy, Economic Development, National Industrial Relations Policies, and 
Workplace IR/HR Practices in Malaysia, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AN 
ERA OF GLOBAL MARKETS: AN ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE (Thomas A. Kochan, Anil Verma & Russell Lansbury 
eds., 1995). 
14
 Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First Contracts: Implications for Labor 
Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75-89 (Sheldon Friedman, Richard Hurd, 
Rudy Oswald & Ronald Seeber eds., 1994). 
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are not clear cut”15. For example, while US law forbids discrimination against workers for union 
activities, it excludes large swathes of the labor force from this protection. 
Thus, beyond a superficial level of analysis, the use of laws as indicators of FOA and CB 
requires very careful in-depth analysis and expert knowledge of national labor law systems. The 
variation within nations on how the law is established and administered, and knowledge of the 
administrative rules surrounding these rights is critical. Interpretation and judgment are 
important if one has to interpret legal positions and opinions, especially when one examines 
violations and uses violations as a basis to score countries. Not all violations of the law are 
reported or documented. The nature of the violations differs within and across systems in their 
intensity; violations may only take place within one or two sectors within a country. It may also 
be possible that a high incidence of complaints pertaining to violations might be indicative of the 
vibrancy and robustness of the rights regime in that country. While there are substantial 
variations in labor law across countries, it is also true that the availability of data regarding labor 
law systems is not uniform across countries, we know a lot about some countries systems but 
less about others. 
The use of complaints or violations as indicators is interesting. They tend to have been 
developed into quantitative indices by individual researchers exercising judgment and based on 
qualitative research. The OECD follows such an approach, coding and assigning numerical 
values to countries regarding compliance with freedom of association16. The problem with this 
approach is that the numerical scores are only as good as the input data, they are not 
15
 Compa, supra note 4. 
16
 They base this on qualitative and descriptive data drawn from a multiplicity of sources, including the ICFTU 
annual survey, US State Department Section 6 reports and ILO Committees (Committee of Experts on Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations- CEARC) and COFA) reports. 
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comprehensive reviews of freedom of association in any given country. Kucera’s approach17 
innovatively uses descriptive reports to generate country scores on freedom of association, but 
there are many data gaps for most countries 18 . Similarly the ITUC’s Annual Survey of 
Violations of Trade Union Rights evaluates broadly the status of collective bargaining and 
freedom of association in countries all over the world. The survey covers both trade union rights 
in law and also details how some of those rights work in practice by reporting on specific nation-
specific violations and problems. These qualitative and subjective indicators are still relevant but 
are incapable of being used in a “standardized” way, given that they reflect the peculiar practices 
and constraints of industrial relations in each country. 
Indicators in Group 3 concern collective bargaining rights. The indicator regarding 
whether the right to collective bargaining exists, is quite popular, but suffers from the problems 
noted above with regard to indicators based on labor law. A second indicator concerns whether 
there is government interference in the collective bargaining process, an indicator that has been 
used by many, including the US DOL, Verite, Kucera and the ITUC. However, each uses very 
different ways of measuring this, based on different sources and coding schemes. 
A final indicator concerns the right to strike, an important one, since collective 
bargaining is meaningless without the right to strike. Here too there is a “gap” between rights 
and practice. What the indicator looks at is whether the workers have the right to strike in the 
legislation. What the indicator does not reveal is whether workers can go on strike in practice. 
There are often many institutional rules and regulations that circumscribe the ability of workers 
to go on strike, that vary dramatically from country to country. For example a country like 
17
 David Kucera, Decent Work and Rights at Work: New Measures of Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining, in THE I L O AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY: THE GENEVA LECTURES (Roger Blanpain, 
Christian Engelss & Peter Auer eds., 2001); QUALITATIVE INDICATORS OF LABOUR STANDARDS: COMPARATIVE 
METHODS AND APPLICATIONS (David Kucera ed., 2007). 
18
 Compa, supra note 4. 
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Singapore (where the right to strike exists) reports zero strikes from the mid 1980s onwards, 
largely because of administrative rules that effectively prevent workers from striking19. In other 
cases, there are limits on the right to strike (such as for workers in essential services. The 
problem here as Compa notes, is “how to decide what limits [on the right to strike] are 
reasonable and what limits constitute an effective denial of the right.20” 
The indicators of Group 4 focus on the role of government, including the extent of 
government interference, and the institutional capacity of governments to enforce laws, and is 
typically measured by data such as the number of inspections, or the number of fines for 
violations of laws, or the adequacy of government inspection staff and so forth. One the one 
hand, finding that some countries do not have enough inspectors to inspect rights violations tells 
us that there is low capacity. On the other hand, most governments do not have large inspection 
staff, yet enforcement of laws is better in some than in others. Where the penalty for violations is 
high, the number of staff may not matter as long as inspection is random or complaint based. 
However, corruption may render inspections meaningless in many countries. Simply having 
measures of the number of people employed by the department of labor is mechanistic. What is 
important is an evaluation of the entire enforcement regime, i.e., the ability of the government to 
enforce, the way establishments are sampled, the penalties for violation and whether that 
constitutes adequate deterrence, and how corruption and inefficiency affects the enforcement 
regime. Evaluating enforcement regimes requires the services of national experts who 
understand the variety of institutions that are relevant in this case and can provide based on their 
close study of these issues an overall picture of enforcement in the country, at the same time 
noting regional and state-to state differences. 
19
 Sarosh Kuruvilla, Industrialization Strategies and National industrial relations Policy in Southeast Asia: 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 49-4 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT J . 635-657 (1996). 
20
 Compa supra note 4 
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Our admittedly brief review of the available indicators suggest the following conclusions. 
First, there is very little agreement amongst the variety of actors interested in FOA and CB 
around the world as to what are the most appropriate indicators to use. No indicator is used by all 
the organizations listed in Table 1, a serious problem in our view since some degree of 
agreement by relevant actors about which indicators are useful is a pre-condition for progress in 
assessment generally!. If any agreement exists at all, it is found in a general tendency to adopt 
indicators that are easily available and easily quantifiable (e.g., such as union density and the 
ratification of ILO conventions), which might be necessary, but do not reveal much about FOA 
and CB conditions in a given country. Second, the focus of the indicators is skewed towards 
measuring rights provided in law (with a greater focus on FOA rights than CB rights), but not 
how FOA and CB works in practice. Third, evaluation of the merits of a variety of indicators 
highlights the need and role for qualitative judgment by experts. Finally, efforts to develop 
indicators via scoring qualitative data (such as data on complaints regarding FOA and CB, 
specific violations of FOA and CB) yield relevant information, but does not provide a uniform 
and consistent indicator. In general, there appears to be a trade-off between having highly 
relevant information based on the unique aspects of FOA and CB in each country and having a 
set of uniform measures that encompass more countries, but are often less relevant. As we get 
closer to the relevance side of this continuum, the tendency is to provide information but let 
readers decide about the FOA and CB status in each country.21 The closer we get to providing 
uniform indicators, we tend to lose relevance. In the next section, we attempt to solve this trade-
off. 
21
 See e.g., ITUC’s annual survey (http://www.ituc-csi.org/) and ILO’s COFA reports 
(http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?hdroff=1) 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INDICATORS 
Below, we present our indicators. We balance the need for relevant information while 
simultaneously having universally applicable indicators in two ways. First we rely on the 
judgment of national experts, but our methodology requires the national experts to provide 
additional data to justify the classification of a country on a specific indicator. In fact, each 
indicator we develop comes with specific guidelines for the national expert and a universally 
applicable classification scheme. Second, the indicators are designed in ways that the national 
experts can use both quantitative data as well as qualitative information regarding violations and 
complaints to support their decision. All of the indicators are based on comparative industrial 
relations research, and therefore sensitive to the variation and diversity in industrial relations 
systems across the world. The five classes of indicators we introduce below includes a category 
called Background Indicators (some of which are used currently, yet require improvement) apart 
from indicators of Freedom of Association (both rights and practice), Indicators of Collective 
Bargaining (rights and practice), Indicators of Outcomes of FOA and CB, and Indicators of 
Labor Law Enforcement. 
Table 2 lists all of the indicators, the categorization schemes that we are suggesting and 
guidelines for national experts who are making judgments in reporting about the state of FOA 
and CB in different countries. Below, we amplify and justify the description of indicators found 
in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
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A. Background Data (BD) 
This category of indicators provides necessary background data to place FOA and CB in 
perspective. They are included here because they are germane to FOA and CB, but also because 
they have been widely used in the past, thus facilitating longitudinal comparisons. However, we 
suggest improvements in how the National Experts should report and interpret these data, and the 
need for additional data. 
BD 1: Union Density and Changes in Density 
Since this measure is almost universally available for most countries, it is worthwhile to 
use, although we need to recognize that union density is not a sufficient indicator regarding FOA 
and CB. There is some scope for improvement of the union density measure. The national 
expert must make clear the following four issues. First, the expert must clarify what the 
denominator is in the calculation of union density. Some countries calculate density as part of the 
wage and salaried workforce (e.g., OECD countries), while others (e.g., US) calculate it as a 
percentage of the non agricultural workforce, while yet others report it as a percentage of the 
civilian workforce (e.g. ILO). We would recommend against the use of the US-centric non 
agricultural workforce measure, largely because agricultural workers in many countries do have 
unionization rights, and agriculture is often the largest sector in many third world countries. 
Second, to the extent possible, the national expert should provide union density data for men and 
women separately. Third, the national expert must report the data source. Many countries use 
unions themselves as the primary source for union membership data (which often results in 
highly inflated union membership figures), while others use national surveys. Where possible, 
the national expert needs to triangulate. Finally, the national expert must report longitudinal 
data, so that trends in union density can be displayed. 
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BD 2: Ratification Status of the ILO Conventions 87, and 98, and the Number of 
violations during the last five year period. 
Data on countries’ ratification status of the ILO conventions 87, and 98, and the number 
of violations of each of these conventions during the last five year period exists currently. 
Monitoring and reporting this might induce more countries to sign the conventions. Although 
signing the conventions by itself does not guarantee FOA and CB , countries that have signed the 
convention can be persuaded to uphold these rights. Also important to report trend data, since we 
are interested in how countries make progress. 
It is thus necessary to use multiple sources of information for this background data. 
National statistics are the obvious first stop, though not all countries have or keep statistics on 
violations of these two conventions. The second stop must include ILO CEARC data and COFA 
data, which can be made available to national experts. Third, other sources of data can be 
consulted. There are obviously many sources (the US State department is an annual source) that 
can be consulted. The key issue here is for the National Experts to report the data, but to also 
make clear the judgment as to on what grounds this is a partial or comprehensive picture of 
vio lat ions. 
BD 3: Labor Force Statistics 
This indicator provides basic information about the labor force in both numbers and as a 
percentage of the population, as well as the size of the labor force in different sectors. The sector 
wise distribution is important for FOA and CB because some sectors tend to evidence more FOA 
and CB than others (e.g., manufacturing over services). Data for this indicator is easily available 
from national or international statistics for most countries. It is important to report employment 
17 
in each sector along with subject to availability some measure of unionization or collective 
bargaining per sector rather than the contribution of each sector to GDP. 
BD 4: FOA and CB rights Coverage and Exclusion 
Who are covered by FOA and CB rights, and who are excluded are critical background 
data since it informs us regarding the percentage of the labor force that has the right to FOA and 
CB, and also tells us of the categories of people who do not. This is also a dynamic measure, 
since it allows us to see whether countries progressively expand the population who has access to 
FOA and CB . If for example one examines this in the Korean case, one will see that in the last 
four years new categories of people like teachers have been given the right to form unions and 
bargain collectively. This data need to be calculated based on the laws in each country, and with 
labor force statistics since in many countries this information is not easily available. Experts 
must provide gender segregated data of exclusion of rights and make clear the denominator that 
is being used. 
B. Freedom of Association (FOA) 
The right to form representative organizations of their own choosing is a primary 
determinant of FOA and CB . This section focuses on how employer and union organizations are 
formed, whether they are free to operate without government oversight or interference, whether 
members of these organizations are protected against discrimination from joining them, whether 
these rights can be taken away either temporarily or at government whim. 
FOA 1. Union (and Employer Association) Formation Process 
There is a great variety in the laws and processes of union formation in the world. In 
some countries, the process is both simple and easy. An example of a simple and easy process is 
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where a majority of workers in a workplace indicate their preference for a union and the union is 
formed. In others the process is long drawn out and difficult, and often having significant 
ramifications for the unions ability to bargain collectively, such as in the US. In the US, 30% of 
members must indicate preference for a union in which case the NLRB conducts elections. Until 
the elections are over, both sides (employer and union advocates) campaign with the workers to 
join or not to join. It is possible for the employer to legally delay the process of union formation 
through tactical actions. In some countries, unions can only be formed if the government permits 
and the government has the absolute right to grant union registration or withhold it, as is the 
case, for example, in Malaysia. 
A categorization scheme (A to D) of union formation process is provided to guide the 
judgment of national experts22. For instance, the US would fall in Category C on this scale, 
(since the union formation process is quite complex and can be challenged on various occasions 
by the employer) while Malaysia (where the Registrar of Trade Unions has near absolute power 
to accord or withhold registration) will fall into category D. Incidentally, in this indicator, we do 
not take into account the situations where unions are banned from forming in some sectors, since 
that is covered elsewhere in this framework. 
FOA 2. Independence of Unions and Employer Associations 
FOA and CB depends heavily on unions and employer associations being independent of 
government control. There is variation here as well. In most countries, unions at the local level 
or national level are independent. But in some countries, unions are heavily controlled by 
governments, which limit their ability to effectively voice the concerns of workers. Assessing the 
degree of government control is not easy. Verite for example has created a four point scale in 
22
 We focus only on the union formation process since in general, there is not as much variation in case of the 
formation of employers associations in most countries, and the process of formation is quite simple. Moreover, often 
there is no legislation limiting the formation of employer associations. 
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which a score of 3 means that multiple unions can organize without government interference, a 
score of 2 for some interference, a score of 1 where unions are closely affiliated with the 
government and 0 for not independent. The literature on corporatism is particularly relevant here 
since different models of corporatism tend to evidence different levels of government control 
over unions23. We use the corporatism literature as a basis for the development of categories 
here, and bearing in mind the difficulty of subjective judgment, recommend a three point scale. 
As example, the US would be classified in Category A (Independent) , while Singapore would 
be in Category B (Unclear) (there is much controversial research that links the People’s Action 
Party and the Singapore National Trade Union Congress, making this arguable) while Korea 
before 1997 would be a good example of category C (Not Independent). 
FOA 3: Protection against Discrimination for Union Joining or Union Activity 
The key issue here is whether nations provide protections from employer or government 
retaliation against those individuals who are active in union organizing or those who join unions. 
Without such protection, FOA and CB cannot move forward. Here too there is variation 
(categorized as A to D), although the extremes are easy to measure. There are many Western 
European countries where the laws do not spell out such violations, but no violation takes place 
due to the institutional history and structure (IR is socially embedded!). The long list of unfair 
labor practices outlined in US legislation might merit its placement in category A (strong 
protections with full recourse or institutional conditions do not permit such violations), but the 
general ineffectiveness of the law as a deterrent to such behavior (which is well documented in 
23
 See e.g., Lane Kenworthy & Bernhard Kittel, Indicators of Social Dialogue: Concepts and Measurements, 5 I L O 
WORKING PAPER (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907429; LANE KENWORTHY , IN SEARCH OF 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC SUCCESS: BALANCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (1995); Lane Kenworthy, Unions, 
Wages and the Common Interest, 28 COM’P POL. S . 491-524 (1996); Lane Kenworthy, Quantitative Indicators of 
Corporatism, 00-4 MAX PLANCK INS’T STUDY OF SOCIETIES DISCUSSION PAPER (2000). 
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the academic literature) and the continuing evidence of violations would only give it at best, a 
place in category B (partial protection with full recourse). In Malaysia, where there is protection 
against discrimination to some extent, but a variety of other actions are de facto permissible 
under the law (e.g., the practice of closing a factory due to union activity and then reopening it 
again with non union employees—indirectly discriminating against union members) would merit 
it, at best, a place in category C. Countries where no protections exist would be placed in 
category D (no protection). 
FOA 4: Right to Tripartite Processes 
Tripartism is an impo rtant dimension of FOA and CB since it provides workers “voice” 
at the national level and it depends heavily on whether the laws provide for it. Many countries 
explicitly provide for tripartism in their national legislations. It is also possible that countries 
make no provision for tripartite relationships, but they are practiced (hence we will differentiate 
between rights and practice). It is also possible that countries provide for tripartism in some 
limited form, i.e. for specific subjects. In addition, the rise of legislation regarding tripartism is 
not an autonomous process, since it is often a result of demands by strong unions. Whatever the 
origins of tripa rtite rights, it is clear however that tripartism flour ishes when it is backe d by 
legislation. Thus, this indicator may be assessed by three categories (Category A to C). Countries 
where the legislation explicitly requires some form of tripartite consultation may be grouped in 
Category A. Category B refers to countries where the law does not specify any requirement or 
form of tripartite practice and do es not disallow it in any form. Countries where tripartite 
processes are explicitly prohibited may be grouped as Category C. 
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FOA 5: Right to Affiliate with Peak Level Unions or Federations 
Even if countries explicitly require or do not prohibit tripartism, there are several ways in 
which the ability of actors to effectively engage in tripartite activity is reduced or enhanced. One 
issue is whether unions or employer associations have the right to affiliate to federations or 
industry level bodies. Most countries do not prohibit such affiliations. However, there are two 
ways in which the right to free affiliation can be limited. The first way reflects those countries 
that prohibit an affiliation. As an example, Malaysia permits enterprise level unions in its 
electronics industry but does not permit those unions to affiliate with industry level unions. In 
other cases, unions are only allowed to affiliate with a specific federation often sponsored by the 
government, without the freedom to affiliate with alternative or competing federations. This is 
also a limitation of tripartite rights. We provide two categories here. Category A includes 
countries which do not prohibit the right to affiliate to higher level organizations or federations. 
Category B explicitly prohibits such affiliation or requires affiliation to a preferred federation to 
the exclusion of other federations. 
FOA 6: Rights of Trade Unions to be Politically Active 
Tripartite FOA and CB has generally been conceived such that employers and union 
organizations participate broadly in economic and political discourse. Yet, many countries 
restrict the ability of unions and employer organizations from doing so. There are two ways in 
which this can be done. One method is to limit the ability of unions and employer associations to 
affiliate with political parties. The second is to expressly forbid peak trade union or employer 
organizations from participating in politics. For example, Malaysian law does not merit unions 
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to be active in politics and requires that peak federations be registered as societies rather than as 
unions24. 
Comparative research provides support for three categories here. The first category 
(Category A) refers to countries where there are no restrictions on union or employer abilities to 
participate in politics or affiliate themselves with higher level organizations or federations. 
Category B will include countries where there are restrictions on the ability of unions and 
employer organizations to affiliate with higher level bodies. Experts can put countries where 
unions and employers are prohibited from participating in political activities and debates in 
Category C. 
C. Indicators of Rights and Practice of Collective Bargaining (CB) 
CB 1: Union Recognition and Obligation to Bargain 
FOA and CB on a bilateral basis cannot take place if there is no obligation on the 
employer to bargain or if bargaining can be delayed. Once unions have formed successfully, it is 
not always automatic that bargaining can start. In some countries, there is a distinction between 
union formation and the recognition of the union as the bargaining agent, an intermediary step 
before the employer is obligated to bargain. In other countries, recognition as the bargaining 
agent takes place at the formation stage. Even after formation and recognition, there is variation 
regarding whether the employer is obligated to bargain. Some countries impose an obligation to 
bargain. Others impose the obligation, but the process is riddled with loopholes such that the 
start of bargaining can be delayed. For instance, in the United States, research shows that in 
roughly 25% of the cases where unions win representation elections, there are delays in 
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bargaining. There are countries which do not impose an obligation to bargain on the employer. 
To take into account the variation in these institutional procedures, three categories (A: Clear 
Recognition and Obligation to Bargain Rules; B: Problems in Recognition or Problems with the 
Obligation to Bargain; and C: No Recognition rules or no obligation to bargain) may be used by 
national experts in assessing their countries on this dimension. As always, the national expert is 
required to justify his/her classification with supporting rationales. 
CB 2: Scope and Subject Matter of Bargaining 
The obligation to bargain by itself does not guarantee that CB will take place. Countries 
differ on what they will allow the parties to bargain about. At one end of the continuum are 
countries (e.g., Sweden) in which co-determination legislation mandates that any subject that is 
of interest to either union or management is subject to bargaining. In the middle of the 
continuum are countries that make a distinction with regard to bargaining subjects. The United 
States, for example uses the “Mandatory” versus “Permissive” distinction25. At the other end of 
the continuum are countries which do not permit bargaining on certain issues. Singapore and 
Malaysia do not permit bargaining on transfers, promotions, job assignments, retrenchment and 
layoffs. Taiwan does not permit bargaining regarding any issue connected with the introduction 
of new technology. Thus, the scope of bargaining directly affects the extent of FOA and CB. 
There are some systems within countries that restrict bargaining subjects for some jurisdictions, 
like in the public sector in some states in the US26. The categorization of this indicator into 
25
 Mandatory subjects such as hours, wages, and working conditions are normal subjects of bargaining, while 
permissive subjects such as management rights or union security issues will be bargained only if both parties agree 
that they are bargainable. This approach gives rise to continual debates on what is a mandatory subject and what is 
permissive. If a decision to subcontract is deemed by management to be part of management rights (accordingly 
permissive subject), the union could argue that the effect of such a decision would be related to wages, hours and 
working conditions of the employees (thus making it a mandatory subject). 
26
 We do not include that here since we think the public sector should be treated differently in a separate category. 
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broad, intermediate and narrow/restricted scope (See Table 2) is based on the variations on the 
scope of subject matter of bargaining to serve as a guide to national experts. 
CB 3: Rights to Strike, Restrictions on the Right to Strike, and Weakening of the right to 
Strike 
Free collective bargaining requires the free right to lockout (for employers) or strike (by 
unions). Many countries have national emergency procedures that restrict the right to strike in 
national emergencies, but we will not take that into consideration here. Similarly, the strike is 
often banned in essential services in most nations, and that too we shall not take into 
consideration here (although some countries may choose to take a broad view of “essential” that 
could be a significant threat to the operation of the right to strike). 
This is a case where the judgment of national experts is key, given the vast variation there 
are in systems, rules and procedures with regard to the right to strike. At one end of the 
continuum are countries that freely permit the right to strike for non essential service workers, or 
at least the private sector. The Western European countries are good examples of this category. 
Then there are countries that freely permit the right to strike to workers directly involved in an 
industrial dispute, but do not permit the workers to go on sympathy strikes. The US and UK are 
good examples that fit into this category. Then there are countries that freely permit the right to 
strike, but significantly weaken the right in certain ways. The US is a good example here since it 
permits the employer to permanently replace striking workers, (thus taking away the power of 
the strike as a bargaining tool) in cases of disputes where there is no unfair labor practice 
involved, such as disputes connected with interests such as wages. Other countries freely permit 
the right to strike, but then de facto take away that right through a plethora of administrative 
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rules and restrictions. For instance, India and Singapore’s dispute resolution rules require that a 
notice of strike be given 14 days in advance. If either party calls for mediation, then the strike 
must be withdrawn and the parties must enter the mediation process. If mediation is not 
successful, the government may refer the dispute to binding arbitration, or to an industrial court 
or tribunal (the two countries differ on this approach), and the disputes gets resolved at that level. 
Theoretically then, strikes will not take place if this procedure is followed. Singapore has not 
reported a strike in the last 12 years, while India reports strikes on a daily basis (which shows 
that the procedure does not work that well in India). Finally, some countries e.g., China, still do 
not permit the right to strike. There are more subtle variations in rules that cannot be captured by 
a simple scoring mechanism, thus requiring national experts to exercise their judgment based on 
research. One such subtle rule that is prone to much variation is the definition of legal or illegal 
strikes under national laws. 
The guideline for experts (See Table 2) takes into account the broad categories noted 
above and is divided into five categories - from unfettered right to strike to no such right at all. 
Unlike several other indicators, we do not place a great emphasis on data regarding strikes, since 
the numbers of strikes and lockouts are affected by a number of issues other than rules, such as 
the economic cycle and shifts in bargaining power etc. We also know that the number of strikes 
have decreased steadily in most countries with the decline in trade union membership. 
CB 4: Parallel Workplace Representation 
FOA and CB is improved if employees have avenues (besides unions) of participation at 
work. In the absence of unions as well, these avenues are important. The most well known 
example of parallel representation is the works council, which is common in most Western 
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European countries. There is great variation in terms of the scope and functions of works 
councils or similar institutions across countries, however. In addition, there is a debate regarding 
whether works councils in fact substitute for unions, and it is this argument that has been cited by 
many unions to oppose government plans to introduce works councils (e.g., USA). However, the 
European experience shows that unions have been able to work well with works councils, in 
many instances exercising significant control over them. And, works councils evolved long after 
unions were formed in most European nations. It is possible that works councils or other parallel 
representative structures represent an evolution in traditional industrial relations concomitant 
with “new forms of work organization” accompanied by high flexible wages, wages tied to skill 
acquisition, high participation, flexible deployment or in other words “functional flexibility”. 
Accordingly, national experts can categorize countries as Category A, where the law 
prescribes the works council or committee with a wide scope and mandates regular meetings. 
Category B would include where the law prescribes some form of workplace level committee, 
even if the scope is restricted. Safety and Health committees are good examples for this category. 
Countries with no provision for workplace level representation may be included in Category C. 
D. Outcome Measures (OM) 
While the measures above deal with both rights and processes underlining FOA and CB, 
it is also important to have some measures of the outcomes of FOA and CB. These are broader 
measures that provide some relatively objective indicators of whether FOA and CB are 
functioning well, and whether the institutions are increasing or decreasing over time. 
OM 1: Collective Bargaining Coverage 
A measure of collective bargaining coverage is essential since it informs us as to how 
many employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements. The number of union 
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members or union density may not be closely related to collective bargaining coverage for a 
number of reasons. In many developing countries (e.g., Philippines), the number of union 
members (based on union records) is much higher than the number of employees covered under 
collective bargaining agreements. This is due to overstatement of union members on the one 
hand, and the presence of unions of unemployed persons, on the other. In France, for example 
collective bargaining coverage rates are very high (almost 80%), although union density figures 
are very low. This is due to the principle of “extension” where agreements reached by some 
unions and employers are extended to the rest of the industry. A second problem with collective 
bargaining coverage is that while some countries have the data, others do not. 
For this indicator to be useful, the national experts need to report the data over time (e.g., 
for the last five years), segregate data according to gender and occupational groups, identify how 
the data was collected, and provide an explanation for why there is a variance between this 
measure and a measure of union density. 
OM 2: Number of Collective Agreements 
The number of collective bargaining agreements tells us whether CB is increasing or 
decreasing. It is a direct measure of the growth of collective bargaining. Although the number of 
agreements might be related to coverage, note that coverage is partly due to other institutional 
forces (e.g., France). It is also possible that coverage could be large even if the number of 
agreements is small if the size of the workforce covered by each agreement is large. Hence, both 
measures are necessary. Note that the number of agreements in any given year will vary based on 
the length of agreements, typically collective bargaining agreements range between 1 and 5 years 
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in duration. Thus, report on the number of collective bargaining agreements annually for at least 
the last five years is essential for this indicator. 
OM 3: Parallel Workplace Arrangements in Practice 
Since we have a measure of rights regarding parallel workplace arrangements it is also 
necessary to see how those rights translate into practice. The international variation in terms of 
how parallel representation arrangements work in practice is great, as is the availability of good 
data. Some countries (e.g., Japan) report the number of joint labor management councils in firms, 
while others do not. In most Western European countries works councils are mandatory, yet 
there is systematic information regarding what they do in practice. These institutions also differ 
substantially in terms of the scope. Works councils in Europe typically are involved in all aspects 
of the employment relationship (excepting wages). There is some evidence in Germany for 
example, that the works councils over time have increased the scope of their decision making 
activities. In contrast there are many countries where the scope is limited. In the Philippines for 
example, labor-management councils typically discuss only safety, health, and welfare issues. 
The national experts must draw on previous research and data on the distribution of 
parallel workplace arrangements to make an assessment for categorizing countries. Countries 
where parallel workplace arrangements generally exist in most firms, and where these 
institutions take substantial decisions regarding the day-to-day workplace issues i.e. where the 
scope is broad may be grouped as Category A. Where a minority of firms only has parallel 
representation arrangements and where they take substantial decisions i.e. where the scope is 
broad may be grouped in Category B. The Category C countries would be where parallel 
representation institutions widely exist, but with a limited scope (e.g., safety and health only, or 
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welfare only or some other combination that suggests limited scope). Category D refers to 
countries where exist limited scope (only in a minority of firms), and Category E country would 
be where no such institutions exist, or if they exist but are not routinely used. 
OM 4: Strikes and Lockouts. 
The concept of free collective bargaining requires that employers and employees have the 
free right to lockout and strike. This is one measure of the health of FOA and CB, and a key 
element of FOA and CB in practice. The actual numbers of strikes and lockouts by themselves 
are open to differential interpretations, as discussed in the previous section. Nonetheless, we 
consider that the data is worth reporting since it is so embedded in national institutions. 
However, national experts should report number of strikes and lockouts over time (preferably for 
last five years) with their judgment on the reasons of such strikes and lockouts including the 
quality of labor-management relations, administrative and political drivers. 
OM 5: Grievances or Industrial Disputes 
This is yet another (and more important) measure of the health of bipartite labor relations. 
It is possible that unions may not strike due to weaknesses in bargaining power, or it is possible 
that employers may not lockout due to weaknesses in bargaining power. However, disputes 
between labor and management are resolved through means other than the strike. For FOA and 
CB to work well, it is essential that employees and employers use these alternative means to 
settle their differences. In addition, in countries where the right to strike is administratively 
restricted27 the number of disputes and grievances may be high, as employees seek alternative 
ways to settle their disputes. 
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The variation in terms of the availability of data is great. Most countries report data on 
the number of disputes or grievances that go to arbitration or other third party resolution 
mechanisms. Some countries also report disputes by cause, which provides even more 
information regarding the health of FOA and CB, since it tells us which aspects of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining are being violated. Here too, given the difficulties of 
interpretation, our suggestion is that the data be reported by national experts without a formal 
assessment, other than to show the trend on the number of disputes and if possible the number of 
disputes by causes for the last five years. 
OM 6: Measure of Tripartite Process in Practice 
Since tripartism is key to FOA and CB, it is necessary to examine how it works in 
practice. The variation across countries is great, even within Western Europe, where tripartism is 
most developed. The literature on corporatism (which is heavily focused on Europe) is a good 
basis for the development and refinement of this measure, although in this paper, we rely on the 
research on comparative industrial relations in developing countries to create categories that take 
into account the variation across countries. Arguably this indicator will not be as sophisticated as 
those available in the corporatism literature, but this measure developed here takes into account 
the greater variation across the world. 
This indicator too, is based on the judgment of the national experts, but backed up by 
research. In countries where there is evidence of regular meetings and cooperation between the 
social partners, and there is clear and documented evidence of the partners participation in key 
macro economic decisions may be grouped as Category A. Data on the regularity of meetings is 
necessary but not a sufficient condition here. It is important that the national expert provide 
concrete examples of national decisions. This could involve wages too. Category B countries 
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would be where there is no regular interaction between the social partners, but when they come 
together when occasion demands it and there are concrete decisions regarding national economic 
and social issues coming out of this decision. Category C refers to countries where there are 
occasional forums that result in meetings between the social partners, primarily for information 
and consultation where the social partners may make recommendations, which may or may not 
be accepted by the government. Psuedo-tripartism, where it is clear that social partners meet but 
not to discuss substantial issues can be grouped as Category D, while Category E would refer to 
no participation in any issue at the national level. 
OM 7: Tripartism Outcomes: Wages. 
Although the measure above focuses on both process and outcomes based on judgment 
backed by research, we consider it useful to have an objective measure as well. Although there 
are a number of measures available in the literature28, we choose the simplest one, i.e. a measure 
of wage drift. Although wage drift may be more appropriate in countries with centralized 
bargaining, it is clear that it is equally relevant in decentralized bargaining situations where there 
is some informal coordination (e.g., Japan). Accordingly, national experts may make judgments 
in grouping countries. Category A countries would be where data on wage drift for countries in 
which bargaining is highly centralized on tripartite or industry level is reported. And Category B 
would be countries where the measure is not applicable and do not report data and bargaining is 
primarily decentralized. 
OM 8: Tripartism Out comes: Inequ ality 
There are multiple reasonswhy this measure should be included in any assessment. While 
it is true that inequality is caused by a number of factors (such as skill differentiation), there is 
also very strong evidence that inequality increases when bargaining systems become 
28
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decentralized 29. Thus, high inequality is likely to be associated with a decrease in tripartite 
activity or no tripartite activity at all30. Apart from this, inequality is also a general measure of all 
components of decent work, and particularly relevant for workers outside the formal sector. 
Income inequality data is reported by the World Bank for most countries. It is important to report 
the Gini-Coefficient over time, but also to report the source of the data, as multiple sources exist 
for several countries. 
E. Government Enforcement of Labor Legislation (GE) 
An important indicator of FOA and CB concerns whether laws are enforced in ways that 
make the practice of FOA and CB possible. In general, there are two means by labor law can be 
enforced effectively. The first is when there the incentives to follow the law are very high given 
the high penalties for non compliance. The second is where there exists an inspection regime that 
is reliable and forces employers and unions to follow the law. 
GE 1: Severity of Penalties for Violations of laws regarding FOA and CB 
The presence of laws pertaining to FOA and CB is not sufficient to ensure that FOA and 
CB takes place. It is possible for actors to break the law or ignore it on a routine basis. For 
example US employers continually violate the law that prohibits firing union organizers. 
Research suggests that they do this given that the penalties or violation are minor compared to 
the savings in costs by keeping a union from forming in their establishments. 
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This subject requires the national experts to exercise judgment, similar to the approach 
taken by Verite. However, to help guide the national experts, we propose two categories, where 
judgment of national experts would draw from trend data for over past five years on penalties of 
violations. Category A refers to countries where the penalties for violations are sufficient to 
deter law breaking. Category B would be countries where the penalties for violation of laws 
pertaining to freedom of association and collective bargaining are not sufficient to deter actors 
from violating the laws. 
GE 2. Governmental Administrative Capacity 
For government inspections to work, governments must have an administrative system to 
conduct the inspections, a sampling procedure that is relevant to the needs of the country, and 
adequate budgets and personnel to make the inspections an effective means of enforcement of laws 
related to FOA and CB. Here too, the national experts must exercise judgment, although that 
judgment should be based on (a) adequacy of personnel and budgets compared to the number of 
workplaces; (b) adequacy of inspections; (c) coverage of establishments; and (d) data on 
violations. Many countries provide sampling schemes and annual data on the number of 
establishments inspected, so there is data available. Based on these issues, the National experts can 
use two primary categories. Based on the above four sets of data, Category A would refer to 
countries where governments have the institutional capacity to monitor labor laws in their country, 
and countries where such institutional capacity is lacking may be grouped in Category B. 
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Summary 
In summary, the design of our scheme requires national experts to support and justify 
their classification of a country on a particular indicator with additional data and research, thus 
enhancing relevance, but also enhancing consistency across different national experts. In order to 
enhance consistency in reporting over time, it is essential that the classifications of countries on 
these indicators by national experts be displayed in a transparent format, i.e., kept on the web, 
where the comments and reactions of other experts and readers may yield information that might 
influence a national expert to change his or her mind, but also help readers, monitoring agencies, 
to put the expert’s classifications in perspective31. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to develop new indicators of FOA and CB, given both the 
dissatisfaction with several currently used indicators and the general lack of progress in FOA and 
CB over the world (in fact, even in countries where FOA and CB have strong foundations, such 
as the countries of Western Europe, there is decline). The indicators that are presented in this 
paper are based on decades of comparative research in industrial relations around the world, and 
therefore sensitive to the international variation in the practice of FOA and CB. Further, they 
include indicators on the practice of FOA and CB, going beyond the limited focus of existing 
indicators on rights only. And, they capture essential processes and how FOA and CB 
institutions work in practice. 
31
 This would make it more transparent than WebMILS, the electronic database at US Department of Labor 
containing information relating to national compliance with international labor standards 
(http://webapps.dol.gov/webmils/) . 
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A key implication of using these measures is that any serious evaluation must be done on 
the basis of reports by national experts who are best situated, through their expertise, to make 
fine-grained judgments about how FOA and CB rights are in place and are practiced across 
countries. Based on comparative research, we provide national experts a “frame” to classify their 
countries, but in every case, the national experts have to provide both arguments and evidence to 
support the classification of the country in particular category. This makes for more work, to be 
sure, but it would avoid the superficiality of current evaluation methods using only the easily 
available quantitative and less relevant indicators. In add ition it is impo rtant to use “evidence 
based” indicators in order to take decisions about whether a country is making progress in FOA 
and collective bargaining over time. Given the increasing linkage between labor standards and 
free trade (e.g. the Peru free trade agreement), the consequences of violation of labor standards 
can be monumental, especially for developing countries that trade with the US. On the other 
hand, reliance on imperfect measures to make decisions that result in these consequences is also 
problematic. The measures advanced in this paper reduce that risk. 
Finally, these indicators are also useful as a tool for compliance officers of corporations 
and the variety of agencies who participate in monitoring in subcontractor factories. The 
database on each country can be a useful guide against which monitors and compliance officers 
make fine grained judgments as to whether there is progress in FOA and CB, since they can 
assess whether their particular factory is doing better than the national average. 
36 
Table 1: Measures of Progress of Countries on FOA and CB 
Indicators 
Right to CB 
Right to strike 
Right to establish and join trade union (simple 
process) 
Collective bargaining coverage rate 
Ratification of ILO conventions 
Restrictions on organizing rights 
Independence of trade union 
Weakening / suspension of FOA 
No Govt. interference in CB 
Restrictions on trade union political participation 
Protection from discrimination when joining union 
Ability of workers to ratify/reject union’s agreements 
Ability to dismiss striking workers / hire permanent 
replacements 
Freedom of affiliation 
Govt. efforts to educate workers on their rights 
Govt. Monitoring of labor relations 
Trade union density 
Incidents of discrimination against union members 
Employer interference 
Freedom to elect union representatives 
Compulsory arbitration 
Scope and subject matter of CB 
Mandated parallel workplace representation 































































































































































Number of CBA’s 
Parallel workplace representation 
Data on number of strikes /lockouts 
Data on grievances /industrial disputes 
Evidence of tripartism in practice 
Alternative avenues for social dialogue (grievance 
pr ocedur es, etc.) 
Severity of penalty for violating social dialogue 
legislation 
Right of FOA in informal sector 
Bargaining centralization 
Employer implementation of labor laws 




















































Indicators Guidelines for National Experts 
Background Data 
Union Density and 
Changes in Density 
Ratification Status of 
the ILO Conventions 
87, and 98, and the 
Number of Violations 
during the last five 
year period. 
Labor Force Statistics 
FOA and CB rights 
Coverage and 
Exclusion 
Indicator should be reported (i) separately for men and women in addition to the total; (ii) 
define denominator (as part of wage and salary earners / civilian / non-agricultural 
workforce) used; (iii) cite data source (unions as the primary source / national surveys); and 
(iv) provide trend data, for last five years, and/or the rate of change 
Report ratification status of ILO conventions 87 and 98, the number of violations of each of 
these conventions during the last five years, and clarify whether this data is a 
comprehensive or partial picture of violations. 
Provide data on employment in different sectors, union density or bargaining coverage per 
sector, and sectoral contribution to GDP. Also report data on fulltime versus part time 
employment. . 
NE to provide a comprehensive picture of the percentage of the working population who 
have access to FOA and collective bargaining rights, and list the percentage of the working 






Freedom of Association National Expert to Provide Justification for classifying countries 
into one of the following categories (for every indicator) 








Union Joining or Union 
Activity 
A: Where the process of union formation is simple and direct; where 
there is no oversight by government bodies including the need to 
conduct elections; where there is no scope for employer opposition; 
B: Where the laws prescribe a lengthy and time consuming process; 
where employers can influence the outcome of elections through 
campaigns or can influence the speed at which a union can form 
through tactical but legal actions; 
C: Where employers can de facto influence the outcome of a union 
election though legal and illegal actions; where these type of actions 
are widely used (substantiated with figures); Where the punishment for 
violations of the law are not enough of a deterrent; 
D: Where unions must seek government permission to form: Where 
government has a history of denying permission (figures needed). 
A. Where it is clear, based on historical studies, case studies, and the 
national expert’s own research, that unions are independent from 
government control, where the government or ruling party is not a 
significant source of union finances, and where the government or 
ruling party does not have control over the union’s strategic goal 
articulation; 
B. Where previous studies, case studies, or based on national experts 
research there is notional independence but some degree of 
government influence over national or local union decisions (examples 
needed), or when one federation is controlled by the government while 
other federations are free from government control; 
C: Where it is clear that the unions in general are controlled by 
government, or only one federation friendly to the government is 
permitted to exist. 
A: Where a broad set of anti-union activities are outlined in the law 
as being illegal; Where law provides procedural recourse that is 
generally considered effective (previous research/case studies) or 





Right to Tripartite 
Processes 
Right to Affiliate with 
Peak Level Unions or 
Federations 
Rights of Trade Unions 
to be Politically Active 
declined in the past five years (provide data), or where such violations 
are non existent due to wider institutional forces; 
B: Where a much narrower set of practices are deemed illegal; Where 
there is a system of resolution provided by law that is generally 
considered effective (research/case studies), and where the data show a 
declining trend; 
C: Where the law does not clearly outlaw anti-union practices, or 
where there is no effective system to resolve alleged violations, and 
where the data show a persistence of violations (report data); 
D. Where there is no protection in the law against discrimination for 
union joining or union activity. 
A. Where the legislation explicitly requires some form of tripartite 
consultation; 
B. Where the law does not specify any requirement or form of 
tripartite practice and does not disallow it in any form; 
C: Where tripartite processes are exp licitly prohibited. 
A: Which do not make any prohibition to this right to affiliate to 
higher level organizations or federations; 
B: Which explicitly prohibits such affiliation or requires affiliation to a 
preferred federation to the exclusion of other federations. 
A: Where there are no restrictions on union or employer abilities to 
participate in politics or affiliate themselves with higher level 
organizations or federations; 
B: Where there are restrictions on the ability of unions and employer 
organizations to affiliate with higher level bodies; 
C: Where unions and employers are prohibited from participating in 







Indicators of Rights and Practice of Collective Bargaining 
Union Recognition and 
Obligation to Bargain 
Scope and Subject 
Matter of Bargaining 
Rights to Strike, 
Restrictions on the 
Right to Strike, and 




National Expert to 
provide justification for 
classification of countries 
into the following 
categories. 
A: Where relevant, there are clear rules regarding union 
recognition, and where the law imposes a clear duty on the 
employer to bargain; Where data shows no violation of the 
obligation to bargain; Where data shows that there are no delays in 
the union recognition process; 
B: Where the rules regarding bargaining and recognition is clear 
but where the practice shows that there are delays in either or both; 
C: Where there are no rules regarding recognition (in cases where 
recognition is required) such that it results in delays in the start of 
bargaining, and/or where there is no obligation on the part of the 
employer to bargain. 
A: Where any item of interest to either party is bargainable ; 
B: Where the rules suggest that some items are bargainable only if 
both parties agree that they are bargainable; 
C: Where the subjects of bargaining are restricted by the legislation. 
A: Where workers may go on strike even in cases where they are 
not directly linked to the dispute (e.g. sympathy strikes); 
B: When workers directly connected with the dispute are freely 
able to proceed on strike; 
C: Where industrial relations rules permit the replacement of 
striking workers, thus weakening the ability of labor to exercise 
their right to strike; 
D: Where the right to strike is curtailed by provisions that require 
withdrawal of strike of the use of compulsory arbitration or 
adjudication for private sector workers; 
E: When there is a ban on the right to strike. 
A: Where the law prescribes the works council or committee with a 
wide scope and mandates regular meetings; 
B: Where the law prescribes some form of workplace level 
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committee, even if the scope is restricted; 
C: Where there is no provision for workplace level representation. 













Strikes and Lockouts 
Grievances or 
Industrial Disputes 
Measure of Tripartite 
Process in Practice 
NE need to report the data over time (e.g., for the last five 
years), segregate data according to gender and occupational 
groups, identify how the data was collected, and provide an 
explanation for why there is a variance between this measure 
and a measure of union density. 
NE to report on the number of collective bargaining agreements 
annually for at least the last five years. 
NE must draw on previous research and data on the distribution 
of parallel workplace arrangements to make an assessment for 
categorizing country. 
A: Where parallel workplace arrangements generally exist in 
most firms, and where these institutions take substantial 
decisions regarding the day-to-day workplace issues; 
B: Where a minority of firms only have parallel representation 
arrangements and where they take substantial decisions i.e. 
where the scope is broad. 
C: Where parallel representation institutions widely exist, but 
with a limited scope (e.g., safety and health only, or welfare 
only or some other combination that suggests limited scope). 
D: Where exist limited scope (only in a minority of firms); 
E: Where no such institutions exist, or if they exist but are not 
routinely used. 
NE should report number of strikes and lockouts over time (for 
last five years) with their judgment regarding the reasons for 
such strikes and lockouts. 
NE to report on longitudinal grievance and dispute data (for the 
last five years). 
A: Where there is evidence of regular meetings and cooperation 








evidence of the partners participation in key macro economic 
decisions. NE should provide concrete examples of national 
decisions in addition to data on the regularity of meetings; 
B: Where there is no regular interaction between the social 
partners, but when they come together when occasion demands 
it and there are concrete decisions regarding national economic 
and social issues coming out of this decision; 
C: Where there are occasional forums that result in meetings 
between the social partners, primarily for information and 
consultation where the social partners may make 
recommendations, which may or may not be accepted by the 
government; 
D: Where it is clear that social partners meet but not to discuss 
substantial issues; 
E: Where there is no participation in any issue at the national 
level. 
A: Where data on wage drift for countries in which bargaining 
is highly centralized on tripartite or industry level is reported; 
B: Where the measure is not applicable and do not report data 
and bargaining is primarily decentralized. 
NE to report the Gini-Coefficient over time, but also to report 
the source of the data. 
GE Government Enforcement of Labor Legislation 
GE 1 Severity of Penalties 
for Violations of laws 
regarding FOA and CB 
NE to report trend data for over past five years on penalties of 
violations and require exercising judgment to categorize 
country based on laws and practices of severity of penalties for 
violations. 
A: Where the penalties for violations are sufficient to deter law 
breaking; 
B: Where the penalties for violation of laws pertaining to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining are not 
sufficient to deter actors from violating the laws. 




administrative capacity based on (a) adequacy of personnel and 
budgets compared to the number of workplaces; (b) adequacy of 
inspections; (c) coverage of establishments; and (d) data on 
violation; 
A: Where governments have the institutional capacity to monitor 
labor laws in their country; 
B: Where such institutional capacity is lacking. 
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